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COMMENTS
BETAMAX AND INFRINGEMENT OF
TELEVISION COPYRIGHT
I. INTRODUCTION
A case pending in Federal District Court in the Central District of
California' will decide whether "vidiots," 2 persons recording copyrighted
television shows on recording machines attached to their television sets at
home, infringe the copyrights of those shows. The plaintiffs are Universal
City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions, owners of copyrighted
television shows. The defendants are Sony Corporation, Sony Corporation
of America, several retail stores and an individual: makers, distributors,
sellers and users of "Betamax," Sony's color video recorder. 3 The basic
allegation4 is that use of Betamax-in home and in store demonstrations-
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
Pre-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Ameri-
ca, 429 F. Supp. 407 (C.D. Cal. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Pre-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff];
Pre-Trial Memorandum for Defendant, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America, 429 F. Supp. 407 (C.D. Cal. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Pre-Trial Memorandum for
Defendant];
U.S. Copyright Office, Second Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
General Revision of the Copyright Law: 1975 Revision Bill (Oct.-Dec. 1975) (unpublished
report prepared for use of Congress in considering the Revision Bill) [hereinafter cited as
Second Supplementary Report];
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1476];
H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1566 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 487].
1. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 429 F. Supp. 407 (C.D.
Cal. 1977).
2. Fong-Torres, Freedom of Video: The Battle Begins at Home, Rolling Stone, Sept. 8,
1977, at 59, col. 2.
3. Though earlier generation models carried a caveat against using it to record copyrighted
material, Pre-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff at 4, Betamax is marketed without any reference
to potential copyright infringements.
4. It was also alleged that defendant's actions constitute unfair competition and intention-
al inference with contractual and prospective business advantage. Pre-Trial Memorandum for
Plaintiff at 93-107.
However, in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 429 F. Supp. 407
(C.D. Cal. 1977), the District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1970). Plaintiffs opposed the
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infringes plaintiffs' copyrights under 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(a), 1(d),5 and that such
use will also infringe the new copyright act, 6 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), which
became effective January 1, 1978. 7
The selling of videotape recorders is a very new,8 rapidly growing
business.9 Universal would like to nip this growth in the bud because it
portends loss of income both from reduced value of re-runs10 and from
competition that is sure to come from videotape pirates lI who will increase
in number with increased accessibility of videotape recorders. On the other
motion to dismiss this noncopyright claim with two arguments. First, certain statements in
advertisements implied that the recording was with Universal's consent and that the recording
was legal. The test for liability was then whether sufficient public confusion was caused as to
the legality of using Betamax. The court rejected this line of reasoning on three grounds.
Section 1125(a) requires a false representation of source or origin, and consent is not such a
representation. Further, the public confusion test is much more appropriate in 15 U.S.C. § 1114
(1970), which has language to that effect while section 1125(a) does not. Finally, even if the
public confusion test were used, Universal faced an impossible burden of proof in distin-
guishing public confusion caused by Sony's advertising from a general preconceived notion that
goods sold on the open market have a legal use.
Second, Universal argued that Sony's failure to disclose to the public the possible legal
consequences of using Betamax was itself actionable. Universal relied on three recent cases
that required an advertiser to make additional statements to escape liability under section
1125(a): Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); CBS, Inc. v. Gusto
Records, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F.
Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The court distinguished these cases from the Betamax case in a two-
step process. It noted that the above cases all required the creation of a false impression and
that none was created here. After all, the legality of Betamax is the question of the suit; any
implied legality may be truthful. Further, Sony was under no obligation to dispel pre-existing,
possibly erroneous ideas. Finally, a failure to disclose is neither "false" nor a "misrepresenta-
tion" as required by section 1125(a).
5. § 1. Any person entitled thereto. . . shall have the exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work; . . .
d) .' . . to exhibit, perform, represent, produce or reproduce it in any manner
or by any method whatsoever ....
17 U.S.C. 99 l(a), (d) (1970).
6. The new Act is significant for any prospective relief since all causes of action arising on
or after January 1, 1978 arise under the new Act. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 112 in note to 17
U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 1977).
7. "[The owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights...
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords .
17 U.S.C.A. § 106(1) (West 1977).
8. Pre-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff at 2. See note 3 supra.
9. See Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1977, at 10, col. 3. Sony has already sold over 100,000
Betamax units. Id. See also Newsweek, Oct. 31, 1977, at 70, col. 3.
10. Meyer, TV Cassettes-A New Frontier for Pioneers and Pirates, 19 BULL. CR. Soc. 16,
38 (1971-72).
11. See United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Drebin,
557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 416 (1977) (pirates dealing in stolen and copied movie films); Wall St. J., March 2, 1978 at 1,
col. 6, and at 40, col. 5.
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hand, Sony would like to exploit the new market, 12 and the home user would
like to enjoy the "freedom" of memorializing whatever appears on his
television set.
The principal question to be decided is whether a home user, acting
without intent to profit, may record copyrighted television shows without
infringing the copyrights.13 A negative answer would result in contributory
liability for the makers, distributors and sellers of Betamax. 14 Possible
indirect results of the litigation would be the shut-down of a new, vigorous
industry15 or the reworking of the licensing and profit structure of the
television industry. Thus, the potential economic impact of the decision is
significant. The purpose of this Comment is to explore whether such limited
in-home copying, done without an intent to profit, infringes television show
copyrights. Recent developments in the right of public performance of a
copyrighted work and in the right of copying sound recordings will be
analyzed. In addition, this Comment will examine a newly-emerging corol-
lary to the equitable doctrine of fair use, the "home use exception."
Although the arguments on both sides of this close question will be pre-
sented, it will be concluded that non-commerical, home recording of copy-
righted televison programs is not an infringement.
12. Sony, of course, has competition in the new market. See Newsweek, Oct. 31, 1977, at
69, col. 1. This competition is driving the price of recorders down. Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1977, at
10, col. 3.
13. A corollary question is whether store demonstrations of Betamax in which copyrighted
material is recorded infringe the copyrights of the material. This is not, however, as serious a
problem as home recording, since it can be eliminated without significantly damaging the
industry.
14. See notes 28-31 infra and accompanying text.
15. It is difficult to imagine what form the injunctive relief would take, since not all
television shows are copyrighted. Injunctions are usually granted to prevent only an unlawful
use. Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, I S.D. 488,47 N.W. 814 (1891) (South Dakota Supreme
Court sustained an ex parte injunction requiring the defendant to give to a court receiver his
unlawfully obtained copy of plaintiff's secret pricing code); 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and
Literary Property § 131 (1965). 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) (old act) clearly provides for injunctive
relief. 17 U.S.C.A. § 502 (West 1977) (new act) will permit issuance of injunctions "on such
terms as . . . [the court] may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain copying of a copyright."
Although arguably unreasonable because it would restrain copying of noncopyrighted shows,
one approach could be simply to bar the sale of audiovisual recorders. Another approach could
be to require, if technologically feasible, that a mechanism be placed in the recorders to prevent
them from recording copyrighted shows. Because it determined that in-home recording of
copyrighted records infringed their copyrights in the records, the First Civil Senate of the
Federal Supreme Court of Western Germany in GEMA v. Grundig G.m.b.H., 17 B.G.H.Z. 266
(1955), granted injunctive relief requiring the manufacturer to place notices on its tape record-
ers that it was illegal to use them to record copyrighted materials. This rather hollow victory for
the plaintiffs was bolstered legislatively by the establishment of a compulsory license mecha-
nism that required the purchaser of a tape recorder to pay a fee to copyright owners at the time
of purchase. 51 B.G.B. 1, 1273, § VI, art. 53(5), reprinted in UNESCO LAWS AND TREATISES OF
THE WORLD ON THE PROTECTION OF PERFORMERS, PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS AND BROADCAST-
ING ORGANIZATIONS (1969).
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II. THE ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY
Assuming that the merits of the claims are reached, 16 and absent
establishment of an equitable defense, 17 plaintiffs have a very strong case
for infringement. The law of copyright gives persons a protected property
interest in the expression of ideas, but not in the ideas themselves. 18 To
establish infringement, a plaintiff must prove ownership of the copyright
and copying19 by the defendant. 20 One commentator has articulated the
16. It is quite possible, however, that the issue of infringement will not be litigated in this
case. There is serious question whether the key defendant-Griffith, the home user-and
plaintiffs are engaging in a collusive suit which should be dismissed for want of adverse
parties. See Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316, 324 (1945) (a complaint by a patent owner
against licensees seeking to have a congressional act declared unconstitutional but seeking no
relief from defendants dismissed for want of adversity); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S.
302, 305 (1943) (suit by a tenant against landlord for violation of rent control dismissed as
collusive "friendly suit" brought at request of defendant); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346, 357 (1911) (case or controversy requires adverse parties). Through discovery, the corpo-
rate defendants have determined that Griffith has retained plaintiffs' law firm several times,
that the plaintiffs' attorneys consider him a nominal defendant and have agreed to waive any
damages against him, that Griffith is indifferent to the outcome of the case and has never
intended to retain counsel to represent him and that Griffith is being sued with his permission.
Pre-Trial Memorandum for Defendant at 66. See generally id. at 65-69. These allegations, if
true, indicate that the District Court lacks jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970) ("A district
court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party. . . has been improperly or
collusively . . . joined"). At any rate, dismissal might be appropriate because of no "honest
and actual antagonistic assertion of rights .... United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305
(1943); accord, Chicago G.J.R. v. Wellman, 149 U.S. 339 (1892); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 251 (1849).
17. See notes 145-88 infra and accompanying text.
18. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. 1, 19 (1907) (Holmes, J., concurring specially); Rokeach v. Avco Embassy Pictures
Corp., No. 75-49 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1978).
19. Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 94-95 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922); see Morser v. Bengor Products Co., 283 F. Supp. 926, 928
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). "Copying" is used here in the ordinary sense of the word; "copy," however,
has become a term of art in copyright law, see M. NIMMER, ON COPYRIGHT § 25.3 (1976).
Whether videotape constitutes a "copy" was the focus of several early discussions on infringe-
ment and videotape reproduction.
One discussion, Meagher, Copyright Problems Presented by a New Act, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rl-V
1081, 1098 (1955), concluded that reproduction of other copyrighted material by videotape
recording would not infringe the copyright owner's right to copy under section l(a) of the old
Act. This conclusion was based on the highly technical definition of "copy" derived from the
reasoning in White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1907). There, the Court
held that a player piano music roll was not a copy of copyrighted sheet music. To be a "copy,"
a thing must be perceivable as a copy of the copyrighted material by the eye: "When the
combination of musical sounds is reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as conceived by
the author which is heard. These musical tunes are not a copy which appeals to the eye." Id. at
17. This definition of copy is now antiquated. Congress, by the Sound Recording Act of 1971,
17 U.S.C. § 1(f) (Supp. V 1975); H.R. REP. No. 487 at 6, and by the definitions of "copy" and
"audiovisual works" in the new act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977), laid to rest Meagher's
argument. Other than the semantical problem, Meagher saw little difficulty in concluding that
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elements of the copying requirement as (1) an absence of independent
production; and (2) either an impermissibly low level of abstraction or
excessive verbatim quoting of the copyrighted work. 2' The independent
production criterion simply means that the genesis of the defendant's work
be derived from the copyrighted work. A presumption of the lack of
independent production arises upon proof that the defendant had access to
the copyrighted work. The presumption can be overcome by a showing of
"strong, convincing and persuasive evidence" of independent creation on
using videotape to reproduce copyrighted material would be an infringement. 30 N.Y.U.L.
REv. at 1094, 1099.
Meagher's conclusions are challenged in Fritch, Some Coypright Implications of
Videotapes (Suggesting the Need for Statutory Revision), 13 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 87
(1964) reprinted in 37 S. CALIF. L. REv. 214 (1964). The article discussed the possible use of the
reasoning of Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 655 (1938), to circumvent the holding of Apollo. In Patterson, the court held that
infringement occurred not only when a negative was made of a motion picture film, but also
when the film was shown by the infringers. Id. at 493. The use of Patterson would "foreclose
the use of private tapes taken off the air for noncommercial purposes . . . . Since courts
certainly would not be anxious to reach such harsh results without express legislative direction,
they may be quite prone to let Patterson drop by the wayside." 13 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP., supra, at 117-18.
20. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87,90 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Leonard Silver Mfg. Co. v. Lillian Vernon Corp., No. 77-4147
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1977); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415,419
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
21. Comment, Copyright Fair Use-Case Law and Legislation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 73, 78-79.
Copying is alternatively formulated to require access to the copyrighted work and substantial
similarity between the copyrighted and the infringing work. Reyher v. Children's Television
Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Leonard Silver Mfg. Co.
v. Lillian Vernon Corp., No. 77-4147 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1977); M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at
§§ 139.4, 141.2. Substantial similarity is a question of whether the average observer would
recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work. Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1974); Mode Art
Jewelers Co. v. Expansion Jewelry Co., No. 77-519 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1977). Recently, the
Ninth Circuit criticized this orthodox formulation of copying as "boilerplate." Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977). In
McDonald's, the court outlined a bifurcated test for substantial similarity. First, an "extrinsic"
test is to be employed to determine the substantial similarity of the general ideas. Id. at
1164. The test is extrinsic because it,involves analysis of criteria such as type of art work
involved, materials used, subject matter and setting of the subject. Id. Second, an "intrinsic"
test measures the substantial similarity between the forms of expression. This test is the
ordinary observer test noted above. The test is intrinsic because it relies on the reasonable
man's reaction, rather than on the identifiable criteria used in the extrinsic test. Id.
McDonald's' extrinsic test does not analyze a matter irrelevant to copyright-the copying of
ideas-despite the court's unfortunate choice of words, but it does determine whether there is
an impermissibly low level of abstraction. Id. at 1163-64. See, e.g., Bradbury v. CBS, Inc., 287
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 801 (1962) (a television show held toinfringe the
copyright of a book because not only does the show have the same general scheme of the book,
but also twenty-two nearly identical incidents), discussed in Comment, supra, at 78 n.35.
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the part of the defendant.22 The question of the impermissibly low level of
abstraction involves a determination of the point, in a spiral of higher and
higher abstraction from a copyrighted work, at which the defendant's
"inspiration" from a copyrighted work becomes merely an appropriation of
ideas, not an appropriation of the copyright owner's particular expression of
those ideas.23 If the "inspiration" is abstract enough, there is no infringe-
ment. 24
The salesman demonstrating Betamax and the home user had access to
plaintiffs' works as they were broadcast over the air. That the Betamax
reproduced identical copies is not in doubt. Thus, the valid copyrights on
plaintiffs' works were arguably infringed by Betamax copying, absent a
showing of an equitable defense.
Aside from the potential liability flowing from the recording involved
in sale demonstrations, 25 the joint, direct liability of the corporate defend-
ants-the makers, distributors and sellers-turns on the liability of the home
user. 26 If the vidiot is not liable for his home recording, then his supplier
cannot directly infringe by simply making and selling Betamax to him. 27
Further, the availability of vicarious liability (which requires a right and an
ability to supervise the infringing activity and a financial interest therein28)
and contributory liability (which requires that the defendants knowingly aid,
22. Mode Art Jewelers Co. v. Expansion Jewelry, Ltd., No. 75-519 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30,
1977).
23. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931); see Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977).
24. See discussion of the McDonald's. "extrinsic" test in note 21 supra.
25. The sale demonstrations of Betamax are infringing acts. As noted, all the prima facie
requisites of infringement are met. Further, the equitable defense of "fair use" and its corollary
"home use" are inapplicable. The sales demonstration fails to fit the criteria for fair use
outlined in the text accompanying note 157 infra and for home use, enumerated in the text
accompanying notes 159-160 infra.
26. See note 33 infra. Plaintiffs argue that the manufacture, sale and advertisement of
Betamax infringe their copyrights. Pre-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff at 9. However, since
Betamax itself does not infringe, the entire line of reasoning depends on whether the core
activity-the copying-is infringement. Compare this fact situation with the one in Ideal Toy
Corp. v. Kenner Prod. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Group, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 291, 299 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), where the defendants, licensee and owner of copyrights to the movie "Star Wars"
counterclaimed that plaintiff's "manufacture, importation, packaging, promotion, sale or other
distribution" of "Star Team" toys infringed those copyrights. Kenner had the license to
manufacture "Star Wars" toys. It is evident that in this situation, the items themselves-the
"Star Team" toys-can infringe, whereas Betamax cannot.
27. Electra Records Co. v. Gem Electronics Dist. Co., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973),
discussed at notes 145-51, infra, is not on point here. There, although a customer deposited his
50 cents in the Make-A-Tape machine, it was the company that essentially did the copying-by
owning the recorders and the records that were recorded, and by selling the blank tapes to the
customers. It was "mass piracy on a custom basis." Id. at 825.
28. See Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir.
1971); Shapiro, Bernstein, Inc. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
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abet or contribute to the infringement 29) also depends upon the liability of
the home user. In patent law, "it is settled that if there is no direct
infringement. . . there can be no contributory infringement." 30 The same
reasoning applies to copyright infringement. It is difficult to conceive of a
secondary infringement when the activity to which it is related is not an
infringement. In its rejection of an amendment to exempt proprietors of
establishments such as nightclubs from liability for infringements by per-
formers, the House Committee on the Judiciary recognized primary liability
as a prerequisite to secondary liability. According to the committee, vicari-
ous liability in the night club situation turns on whether the proprietor
controls the operation of the establishment or the contents of the infringing
program, and on whether he derived commercial gain from the perform-
ance.31 If the program were not infringing, the proprietor would not be
liable. Furthermore, fair use is not "privileged infringement"; it is not
infringement at all.32 Thus, the doctrine that one joint tortfeasor is not
relieved from liability simply because the other joint tortfeasor is privileged
or immune 33 has no application here. The determinative liability, then, is
that of the home user. Whether his liability, and consequently the liability of
the sellers, makers and distributors can be established depends on whether
the vidiot can prove either of the available equitable defenses: fair use or its
emerging corollary, home use.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO PERFORM IN PUBLIC
Recent cases under the old copyright act 34 concerning the exclusive
right to perform and the congressional reaction to them as reflected in the
29. Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir.
1971); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). See generally Annot. 14 A.L.R. Fed. 825 (1973).
30. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961) (emphasis
in original).
31. H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 159.
32. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1977) (new act). See also Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures,
Inc., 20 F. Supp. 249, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). However, some confusion on this point did exist
under the old Act. Needham, Tape Recording, Photocopying, and Fair Use, 10 ASCAP CoPY-
RIGHT L. SyMP. 75, 79 (1959).
33. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 880 (1934).
34. Section one provides that it shall be the exclusive right of the owner of copyright:
(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama, or, if
it be a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any manuscript or
any record whatsoever thereof; to make or to procure the making of any transcription
or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any
method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or reproduced; and to exhib-
it, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method
whatsoever; and
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical
composition . . ..
17 U.S.C. § 1(d),(e) (1970).
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new Act form a conceptual framework that is helpful in analyzing problems
concerning the right to copy. Several reasons support the analogy between
the right to perform and the right to copy or record. First, the Supreme
Court's decisions in the area of public performance represent its most
significant recent addition to the body of copyright law. Thus, by scrutiniz-
ing the policies that lie behind both the Supreme Court cases and the
congressional reaction to them, one can gain insight into the latest thinking
of Congress and the Court on the proper approach to take when questions of
infringement arise. Second, the rights to copy and publicly perform are
both subject to the stress caused by the evolution of modern electronic
communications; that is, as the possible methods of public performance
expanded through the electronic communications system, the sources and
methods of copying have also expanded. Finally, in both areas it must be
recognized that the equitable defenses operate to defeat what would other-
wise be the copyright owner's exclusive rights. Although the "exclusive"
rights to copy and to publicly perform cover different types of conduct, the
term "exclusive" connotes the same idea in both areas-namely, that it is
the copyright owner's sole prerogative to do what he chooses with the
copyrighted object, subject only to an equitable defense.
In considering the right to perform, it must be kept in mind that the
conclusions that have been reached in the radio broadcast area are at odds
with those affecting cable television (CATV)2 5 Whereas developments in
CATV support a finding of liability for use of Betamax, the developments in
the radio broadcast area support a finding of non-liability. The following
section discusses copyright infringement of radio broadcasts and focuses
primarily on the recent case of Twentieth Century Fox Corp. v. Aiken.36
Aiken suggests two possible grounds for non-liability: (1) de minimus
performance and (2) implied-in-law consent. This Comment will examine
both possible grounds and conclude that the first, but not the second,
constitutes a viable arguement against liability.
A. Aiken and De Minimus Performance.
Aiken was the final case in a series of decisions that began with Buck v.
Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. 37 In Jewell-LaSalle, the defendant's hotel main-
tained a "master radio receiving set" wired to supply music by speaker and
headphones to all public and private rooms in the hotel.38 Neither the radio
35. Cable television or community antenna television systems require the construction of a
large antenna capable of receiving weak television signals. These signals are rebroadcast to
paying customers. See notes 60-75 infra and accompanying text.
36. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
37. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
38. Id. at 195.
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station nor the hotel was licensed by the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) to publicly perform plaintiff's songs. 39
Disregarding prior authority on the meaning of "perform," 40 the Court held
that the hotel's mere reception of songs for the benefit of its patrons from a
radio station without a copyright license to broadcast the songs violated the
copyright owners' exclusive rights to publicly perform for profit.41 This
holding was widely thought to require business establishments to obtain
broadcast licenses to receive and play radio music for patrons of the
establishments to avoid potential copyright infringement. 42
Within the past ten years, the Court has increasingly narrowed the
scope of Jewel-LaSalle. The cases that initially signaled the demise of
Jewell-LaSalle arose in the context of CATV. 43 In Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc.,44 plaintiff sued for infringement of its
copyrights in motion pictures by a CATV cable television company that
received broadcasts of United Artists' programs over five stations and
carried them to Fortnightly's customers. The customers lived in a hilly
region from fifty-two to eighty-two miles from the points of broadcast,
making ordinary reception very difficult. The cable company originated no
broadcasts and carried the stations' broadcasts in their entirety. The Su-
preme Court concluded that the principle of decision as to whether there was
a "performance" focused on whether the function of the CATV fell into a
"broadcasting" or a "viewing" category. 45 It was held that the function of
the CATV fell "on the viewer's side of the line"; 46 hence the CATV was
deemed not liable for publicly performing United Artists' copyrighted pro-
grams.
Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc. 47 extended the functional broadcas-
ter-viewer analysis. Owners of the copyrights in television programs sued
five CATV systems for infringement by public performance. The cable
systems were more sophisticated than the one in Fortnightly and carried the
signals up to 450 miles from the point of original transmission. Reception at
that distance by ordinary antennas would have been impossible. The Second
39. Id. at 199.
40. Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General
Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
41. 283 U.S. at 199-200.
42. See H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 86-87.
43. There is a wealth of material on cable television. See, e.g., Note, CATVand Copyright
Liability: Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., The Consensus Agree-
ment, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1507 (1974).
44. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
45. Id. at 397.
46. Id. at 399.
47. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
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Circuit distinguished cable systems that carried the broadcast signals within
an area in which viewers could pick up the signals with ordinary antennas
from those that carried the signal beyond the capability of ordinary anten-
nas. It held that the former, carrying "community signals," merely en-
hanced the viewer's capacity to receive and thus constituted no infringe-
ment, whereas the latter, the carrying of "distant signals," was in the nature
of a broadcast falling within the context of a performance and hence was an
infringement.4 8 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision as to community
signals but reversed the decision as to distant signals. The Court found that
technical differences between the distant and community signals did not
change the function of the CATV. It then concluded, in view of its assess-
ment that the carrying of distant signals would not "interfere in any tradi-
tional sense" 49 with the value of the copyright, that even the distant signal
carrier was functionally a "viewer."
Fortnightly's and Teleprompter's erosion of Jewell-LaSalle laid the
groundwork for Aiken. In Aiken, the owner of a small, fast-service restau-
rant installed a radio with four speakers in his restaurant and played the radio
during business hours. Although the station that Aiken's radio received was
licensed by ASCAP to publicly broadcast plaintiff's copyrighted songs
(unlike the situation in Jewell-LaSalle), Aiken himself was not so licens-
ed. 50 Plaintiff's suit alleged that Aiken's playing of the radio at his business
establishment violated plaintiff's exclusive right of public performance. 51
The Supreme Court held, on the basis of Fortnightly and Teleprompter, that
reception of a broadcast cannot be a "performance" if the broadcaster is
licensed. 2 Thus Aiken narrowly limits, and arguably overrules, Jewell-
LaSalle .
The Aiken Court held that although the radio was played in a commer-
cial setting, there was no violation of the section 1(e) right to publicly
perform for profit. To play the radio was functionally not to perform.54
48. Id. at 401. Additional distinctions from Fortnightly were that the Teleprompter systems
originated some shows, the defendants sold commercial space on distant signals to local
advertisers and the CATV systems sold the broadcasts to each other. Id. at 404. These factors
were held insignificant. Id. at 405.
49. Id. at 412. The Court reasoned that the advertisers and not the viewers buy from the
broadcaster and the advertising rates are based on expected numbers and types of audiences; it
found that CATV does nothing to the system but change the numbers. Thus, it concluded, the
introduction of the distant signals does not alter the profitability of the copyright. Id. at 411-12.
50. 422 U.S. at 153.
51. See note 34 supra. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970).
52. 422 U.S. at 161-62.
53. Id. at 162, 166 (Blackmun, J., concurring); M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 107.41;
Note, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken: Are Broadcasting Signals Dedicated to the
Public?, 36 U. Prrr. L. REV. 994 (1975).
54. 422 U.S. at 161-62. As discussed in text accompanying notes 45-46 supra, the Court in
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However, the Court went beyond this basis of decision-functional similari-
ty to a viewer55-and suggested three alternate bases: first, to find an
infringement in the case would create a practically unenforceable rule,5 6
given the countless number of small businesses; second, the receiving
"performer" would be unable to guard against copyright infractions based
on a broadcaster's unlicensed use of copyrighted songs;57 and third, if the
small commercial establishments were considered to perform, the result
would be the requirement of "untold numbers of licenses for what is
basically a single public rendition of a copyrighted work." 58 These alterna-
tive bases imply that, even disregarding the definition of "performance,"
technical infringement will be modified by the principle of a de minimus
violation. 59 The notion of de minimus violation gains strength from and is
clarified by Congress' reaction to Aiken.
The congressional reaction' to the problem faced in Aiken is codified
in 17 U.S.C.A. section 110(5) of the new copyright act. 61 According to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, section 110(5) codified "the traditional,
pre-Aiken, interpretation of the Jewell-LaSalle decision under which puiblic
communication by means other than a home receiving set, or further trans-
mission of a broadcast to the public, is considered an infringing act.''62
However, a more accurate statement of the effect of section 110(5)63 is that
Teleprompter and Fortnightly laid down the test for "performance" used in Aiken which
distinguished functionally between a performer's actions and a viewer's actions.
55. "[I]f Fortnightly, with its elaborate CATV plant and Teleprompter with its even more
sophisticated and extended technological and programming facilities were not 'performing,'
then logic dictates that no 'performance' resulted when the [respondent] merely activated his
restaurant radio." 422 U.S. at 161-62 (quoting from the decision of the Third Circuit).
56. 422 U.S. at 162. See Newsweek, Oct. 31, 1977, at 69, col. 1). By autumn of 1977
several prominent television manufacturers had their own videotape recorders on the market.
With an intensive advertising campaign planned, producers were hoping to sell 250,000 units by
Christmas, 1977, and 750,000 in 1978. Prices continue to fall, opening the market to an
expanding group of buyers. See Wall St. J., March 29, 1978, at I, col. 6.
57. 422 U.S. at 162.
58. Id. at 163.
59. See Needham, supra note 32, at 83, 86-87.
60. The legislative recognition that there should be an exemption from liability for a small
business with a home-type system dates to 1961. Second Supplementary Report, c.4 at 3-6; see
also 17 U.S.C.A. § 111(a) (West 1977) (new act).
61. § 110. [T]he following are not infringement of copyright:...
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a work
by the public reception of the transmissions on a single receiving apparatus
of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless-
(a) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(b) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public . ...
62. H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 87; Second Supplementary Report, c.4 at 11.
63. The Register in his 1961 report to Congress conceded that, under Jewell-LaSalle, it was
possible that any business establishment that operated a radio or television faced liability. He
recommended an exemption to cover the "mere operation of receiving sets." Second Sup-
plementary Report, c.4 at 4. Realizing that the question of liability had not been decided in the
small business-home receiver situation, the Register, in the 1965 Supplementary Report, for-
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it codified the result in Aiken64 while expressly rejecting its functional
definition of performance. 65 In other words, in Congress' view Aiken was
rightly decided but for the wrong reasons. As Aiken correctly held, in a
small commercial establishment the use of an ordinary home receiver with
four ordinary loudspeakers is not an infringement. Since Congress rejected
the Court's functional performance rationale, the facts in Aiken and its
alternate bases for decision become significant in determining the applica-
bility of Aiken exception for de rninimus 66 violations in other situations.
The Aiken rationale based on practical unenforceability seems appro-
priate to the Betamax situation. Enforcing an exclusive right to copy,
unmodified by an exception for de minimus violations, would be just as
"practically impossible" as enforcing an unmodified exclusive right to
publicly perform. 67 Practical unenforceability could have one of three mean-
ings. First, it could be an expression of the Court's desire, as a matter of
judicial administration, to refrain from "opening the floodgates" on litiga-
tion in this area. Second, practical unenforceability could mean "over-
whelming numbers," that is, the sheer number of potential infringements
mulated an exception similar to section 110(5) that was intended "[tjo make clear that it is not
an infringement of copyright merely to turn on, in a public place, an ordinary radio or television
receiving apparatus of a type commonly sold to members of the public for private use." Id. at
5. A House Committee report following the Register's report concurred and stated that the
potential for abuse of the exception did not justify "making vast numbers of small business and
professional people guilty of technical infringements." Id. at 6 (emphasis added). It appears
then that prior to Aiken, the Register and Congress were not at all sure whether the Aiken-type
use was an infringement under existing law.
64. Under the particular fact situation in the Aiken case . . . it is intended that the
performance would be exempt under clause (5). However, the Committee considers
this fact situation to represent the outer limit of the exemption. . . . Thus, the clause
would exempt the small commercial establishments whose proprietors merely bring
onto their premises standard radio or television equipment . . . but it would impose
liability where the proprietor has a commercial "sound system" installed or converts
* ' * [home equipment into the equivalent].
H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 87.
65. "The majority of the Supreme Court in the Aiken case based its decision on a narrow
construction of the word 'perform' in the 1909 statute. This basis for the decision is completely
overturned by the present bill. ... H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 87; accord, Second Supplemen-
tary Report, c.4 at 11.
66. The de minimus character of the Aiken facts stems from use by a small business of
ordinary, unadapted radio and television sets to incidentally entertain patrons.
67. It could be argued that since Congress codified the principle for de minimus perform-
ances in section 110(5), by negative implication the principle is inapplicable in other areas, such
as the right to reproduce, section 106(1). On the other hand, section 110(5) is a codification of an
exemption, not the creation of a new one. A negative implication should arise much more
quickly in the latter than in the former case. Further, it can be said that statutory recognition of
a situation where common law determines the absence of infringement in one category does not
foreclose the situation from arising in a different category, with similar consequences. After all,
Aiken is a performance case. It is entirely reasonable to say that congressional treatment of the
Aiken situation in a performance context is simply an approval of the principle of de minimus
infringements in the concrete context in which it has arisen. Disapproval is not thereby implied
for all other situations.
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precludes any systematic vindication of the copyrights. 68 "Overwhelming
numbers" is probably the Court's interpretation of practical unenforceabili-
ty; nevertheless it seems illogical to argue that because there are massive
violations of a copyright, the violations are therefore of a de minimus na-
ture.69 The third possible meaning of practical unenforceability is that the
individual violations have an insignificant impact. This would suggest that,
in the Aiken situation, it is a waste of time and money to attempt to enforce
against small shopkeepers or restauranteurs since the impact of each infring-
ement would be insignificant. 70 The insignificant impact interpretation, of
course, does not look to the combined impact of individual uses but only to
the isolated impact of a single individual's uses.
The second alternative basis in Aiken-inability to avert infringe-
ment-is essentially inapplicable in the Betamax situation. 71 The third
alternative basis of Aiken concerns the geometric expansion of the potential
profitability of copyrights. That is, after the copyright owner licenses a
broadcasting station to perform his work, he stands to profit again when the
work is broadcast, under Jewell-LaSalle, by licensing the multitude of small
shopowners who play the broadcast on their sets. This basis also supports a
holding of non-liability from Betamax use.
Although arguably offset by a decline in re-run revenues, the potential
for increased liability for copyright infringement (or increased susceptibility
to some future licensing agreement) is comparable to the potential increase
in liability that the Court rejected in Aiken. Most importantly (and as
68. Yet, it could be argued that the manufacturers of videotape recorders, through their
intensive promotion campaigns for Christmas, 1977, were attempting to create such a situation
and thus to present the court with a fait accompli.
69. Even if "practically impossible" is defined to mean "overwhelming numbers," it could
be argued that the proper approach to infringement is not to collect individual users and add
together their impact. This contention is plausible because the association of "overwhelming
numbers" and de minimus is a contradiction in terms: massive numbers are, by definition, not
de minimus. Thus, associating overwhelming numbers and de minimus suggests that it is not the
collective impact, but the individual impact, that is de minimus.
70. The insignificant impact interpretation receives some support by the Court's notation
that "[a]s a matter of so-called 'policy' or 'practice,' . . . ASCAP has not even tried to exact
licensing agreements from commercial establishments whose radios have only a single speak-
er." 422 U.S. at 162 n.12. This interpretation of the "practically impossible" language rests
upon the impact of an individual's actions rather than the impact of a class' actions. Even if the
Court meant "overwhelming numbers", see text accompanying note 69 supra, no practical
difference separates the "overwhelming numbers" interpretation from the insignificant impact
interpretation. The collective impact of an "overwhelming number" of performances simply
cannot be de minimus.
71. The restaurant owner who plays a radio for his customers cannot ascertain that the
radio station has not received a license for a song and that the latter is therefore infringing. By
contrast, the Betamax home user, assuming that proper licensing by a television broadcaster
will not absolve the recorder as it will the small "performer," can simply not record a
copyrighted show.
1193Vol. 1977:! 181]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Congress has noted) the facts of Aiken suggest a common sense notion of a
de minimus violation: there is a difference in kind between the home user
and the recording pirate.
One apparent factor supporting liability for vidiots is the enactment of
section 111 of the new copyright act.72 Congress essentially agreed with the
Second Circuit's analysis in Teleprompter as to the significance of the
difference between local and distant signals73 when it required that all
retransmissions beyond the "local service area" be licensed. However,
Congress only made the carrying of distant signals subject to the compulsory
license; as under Fortnightly, the carrying of local signals does not create
liability. In so drawing the line, Congress apparently recognized the
economic impact of copyright infringements and thus went to the heart of
the economic incentive rationale of copyright law. "The Judiciary Commit-
tee has tried to resolve each issue by applying the standard of what best
promotes the constitutional mandate to encourage and reward author-
ship." 74 In this manner, Congress emphasized economic impact over the
existence or non-existence of a profit motive by the retransmitter. Even
though all cable systems engage in the secondary transmissions with intent
to profit, only some, based on their economic impact, are liable to the
owners of copyright. This might suggest that the users of Betamax should be
held liable because they will have an adverse collective impact on the
plaintiffs' market. However, it must be noted that section III is essentially
addressed to cable systems which one House Report specifically charac-
terized as "commercial enterprises."- 75 Further, sections 11 l(a)(1) and (4)
provide that a secondary transmission is not an infringement if it is made by
a government or other nonprofit organization, or by a hotel or apartment
house to its guests without a direct charge. This suggests that although
Congress did not intend that the existence of a profit motive always triggers
72. Under section 111(f), all carrying by a cable system is a "secondary transmission."
Fees for the compulsory license are due, on differing percentages, on two bases. First,
transmitters broadcasting secondary transmissions beyond the "local service area" of the
"primary transmitter," which, although not defined in section 111, is a station that originally
broadcasts signals (and also a cable system whose signals are being rebroadcast by another
cable system) must pay a fee, see 17 U.S.C.A. § I I l(f) (West 1977), H.R. REp. No. 1476 at 88.
Second, fees are also calculated on percentages of gross income based on "distant signal
equivalents," 17 U.S.C.A. § I 1 l(d)(2)(B) (West 1977). Distant signal equivalents are defined in
terms of secondary transmissions beyond the local service area, id. § I I (0. Local service area
is essentially the area from which the primary transmitter's signals can be received, see id. §
1 l(f); H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 99. Thus, although there are further distinctions between the
types of programs carried, liability is determined along the lines of economic impingement. For
a good summary of the legislative history of section 111, see Second Supplementary Report, c.5
at 2-26.
73. H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 90, 99; Second Supplementary Report, c.5 at 28 & 29.
74. 122 CONG. REC. S1546 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1976) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
75. H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 89.
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liability, it did consider profit motive to be a significant factor in determin-
ing liability.
In summary, Aiken and the congressional response to it create a de
minimus exception to infringement of the right to perform that could easily
form the basis for an exception to liability in the Betamax/right to copy
context. Home use of Betamax fits readily within most possible construc-
tions of the exception for de minimus violations. However, the establish-
ment of the compulsory license system for cable systems carrying distant
signals (but not for those carrying only local signals) supports the argument
that liability should be premised on adverse economic impact. Such adverse
economic impact in the Betamax situation would appear to be in the
cumulative impact of Betamax users on the copyright's value. The cable
television development could then easily form the basis of a finding of
liability in the Betamax context.
B. Aiken and Implied Consent.76
In Jewell-LaSalle, neither the hotel nor the radio station was licensed
to perform plaintiff's songs. The Court suggested that if the radio station had
been licensed, a license for commercial distribution might have been im-
plied,77 and that the decision in Buck v. Debaum7s would then have been
controlling.
In Debaum, the owner of a popular cafe in Los Angeles installed a
radio receiver in the cafe and received plaintiff's copyrighted song from a
radio station that was licensed by ASCAP to broadcast it. The court held for
the defendant cafe owner on two grounds: that the act of turning on a radio,
making audible the sound waves present, did not constitute "performance"
under copyright law; and that by licensing the radio station, "[the copyright
owner] must be held to have acquiesced in the utilization of all forces of
nature that are resultant from the licensed broadcast . ... "9 Although
Debaum has been distinguished80 and rejected sub silentio, s1 it was revived
by the recent Supreme Court cases that cut back drastically the scope of
Jewell-LaSalle. In Fortnightly, the Court noted that the Jewell-LaSalle
court might have held differently if the radio station had been licensed and
that Jewell-LaSalle "must be understood as limited on its own facts.' '82 In
76. See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 107.43; Pre-Trial Memorandum for
Defendant at 45-47.
77. 283 U.S. at 198, 199 n.5.
78. 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
79. Id. at 736 (emphasis added).
80. Famous Music Corp. v. Melz, 28 F. Supp. 767, 769 (W.D. La. 1939).
81. Society of European Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler
Co., 19 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
82. 392 U.S. at 397 n.18.
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Aiken, which did limit Jewell-LaSalle to the facts of the case, the Court
again referred to the Jewell-LaSalle/Debaum distinction.8 3
On this basis, it has been argued that a "license to the station implies,
as a matter of law, a license for multiple performance as well."'8 4 The
applicability of this argument to the use of Betamax appears at first blush to
be strained, not only because there was an alternate holding in Debaum, but
because the infringement alleged in Betamax is copying, not performing. 85
However, this potential interpretation of copyright law might be viewed as a
convenient tool to protect an arguable public interest in the airwaves.
Debaum suggests the importance of this public interest in holding that the
copyright owner acquiesced to all "forces of nature" resulting from that
broadcast by issuing the license to the station.8 6 Teleprompter Corp. v.
CBS, Inc. 87 reflects the Debaum approach. There, the court argued:
When a television broadcaster transmits a program, it has made public
for simultaneous viewing and hearing the contents of that program. The
privilege of receiving the broadcast electronic signals and of converting
them into the sights and sounds of the program inheres in all members
of the public who have the means of doing so.88
The reasoning that something special happens for copyright purposes
when materials are broadcast over the air does not imply that the copyright
owner surrenders all property rights in his work upon its broadcast. Broad-
casting material capable of being copyrighted does not "publish" the
material and place it in the public domain, thereby rendering the work
uncopyrightable.89 Nor does the fact that the television station broadcasts
without license a copyrighted item over the public airways immunize the
station from liability. 90 Indeed, at least one case clearly holds that copying
83. 422 U.S. at 160.
84. M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 107.43.
85. In other words, it is harder to say that copying is implied from the licensing to broadcast
than it is to say that multiple performances are implied from the license. The "performances"-
nothing more than turning on the receiver and listening-are exactly what is contemplated by
the license. The public, by tuning in, does what is necessary to complete the performance; the
tuning in provides the audience. But copying by the public is a step beyond; it is not necessary
to complete the performance.
86. 40 F.2d at 736.
87. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
88. Id. at 408. See Pre-Trial Memorandum for Defendant at 27-31.
89. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); King v. Mister Maestro,
Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Uproar v. NBC, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 358 (C.D. Mass.
1934); CBS, Inc. v. Documentaries, Unlim., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct.
Special Term, 1964).
90. Smothers v. CBS, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 723 (C.D. Cal. 1973). But see Mura v. CBS, Inc.,
245 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In Mura, plaintiff was the owner of copyrights on certain
hand puppets and defendant broadcast the "Garfield Goose Show." Without any consent
requested or given, defendant broadcast images of Mura's puppets on the show for approxi-
mately thirty-five seconds. While it was broadcasting the show, CBS made a film recording of
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or recording broadcasted materials consitutes copyright infringment. 91 Walt
Disney Productions v. Alaska Television Network92 is a cablevision case
that was decided shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Fortnightly.
Walt Disney claimed infringement of its copyrighted motion picture photo-
plays on the basis that the defendant recorded broadcasts received from
television stations on videotape. The recording was an integral step in the
process whereby defendant carried television broadcasts from Seattle and
Tacoma, Washington to Juneau, Alaska. 93 These broadcasts were delayed
up to a week. Although the decision is ambiguous on the crucial question of
whether recording alone without commercial exploitation violates section
1 (d),94 the court does appear to so hold: "The preparation of the video tapes
of copyrighted materials infringed upon the rights of the copyright owner
the program. The court held that CBS did not infringe Mura's copyright under section l(a)
because the copy--an evanescent reproduction-was so different in form from the puppet and
because CBS's use of the puppet was fair.
91. In Miller v. Goody, 125 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), related case, 139 F. Supp. 176
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd sub nom. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.
1957), defendant Krug consented to a decree of infringement for manufacturing records of a
radio broadcast of Major Alton "Glenn" Miller and his A.E.F. Orchestra, which contained nine
copyrighted musical compositions. 248 F.2d at 261. However, Krug's recording was not made
off the air but rather from records of the broadcast. 139 F. Supp. at 176. In CBS, Inc. v.
Documentaries, Unlim., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. Special Term, 1964),
Documentaries recorded off the air a radio broadcast by a CBS news announcer about the
assassination of President Kennedy and incorporated the announcement into a phonograph
record produced for commercial distribution. 248 N.Y.S.2d at 810. After holding that the
broadcast was not a general publication, the court held that "[t]his is a clear case of appropria-
tion for commercial profit of another's property right," 248 N.Y.S.2d at 812. Thus, both the
copying and the incorporating were elements of the tort; the case did not hold that the copying
itself was either a state law or a federal copyright law violation. In Metropolitan Opera Ass'n,
Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950),
plaintiff brought an action based on misappropriation because defendant recorded the opera's
broadcasts off the air and sold recordings to the public. As in Documentaries, the gravamen of
the action lay in the recordation of the broadcast and the commercial exploitation of the
recording.
In Encyclopaedia Britannica Ed. Corp. v. Crooks, No. 77-560 (W.D.N.Y., Feb. 27, 1978),
the court preliminarily enjoined the defendant, a non-profit corporation organized to provide
educational services to public shools in Erie County, New York, from videotaping plaintiff's
copyrighted motion pictures from television broadcasts and from recopying them for distribu-
tion to the schools. See note 159 infra. The court's holding that plaintiff had proven probable
success on the merits without discussing the public's interest in the airwaves-especially
in light of the fact that defendant's copying was for educational purposes-argues strongly
against the implied in-law consent.
92. 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
93. Id. at 1074.
94. Defendants could hardly contend that it would not be an infringement of copyright
for one to receive the broadcast of a copyrighted song by way of radio, record it on a
master disc, and then play it over another radio system or "Musak" system . . ..
While the defendants did not make the videotapes available on a widespread basis, the
video tapes were capable of being sold to any cable television station with the proper
equipment.
310 F. Supp. at 1075 (first emphasis added; second in original).
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under § l(d), and the dissemination of the programs through defendants'
cable system also constitutes an infringement." '95
Alaska Television involves CATV and could have been treated as a
public performance case. However, in an apparent attempt to avoid the
holding of non-liability in Fortnightly, it was treated as a copying case. For
this reason, and because it involves commercial exploitation of the
recording, Alaska Television has little precedential value for the Betamax
case insofar as non-commercial recording is in issue. Furthermore, the
precise holding of Alaska Television has been legislatively reversed by the
new copyright act. 96 However, interpreting the legislative reversal to mean
that broadcast of a copyrighted work precludes copyright infringement is not
warranted by the narrow scope of the legislative reversal and by section
112(a) of the new Act.97 The narrowness of the very technical reversal of
Alaska Television certainly suggests that nothing special happens for copy-
right purposes on broadcast to shrink the protection of copyright.
The primary rationale for the implied consent theory in the Debaum-
public performance area is the similarity between the actions constituting the
second public performance and actions necessary to complete the first public
performance.98 In other words, the act of turning on the TV or radio results
in the second public performance, but that same act is a necessary step in
completing the first public performance; otherwise, the program will have
been broadcast but never received.
To extend the implied consent theory to encompass memorialization,
however, requires a further rationale, one rooted in the first amendment. 99
95. Id. at 1075.
96. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 111(e), (f) (West 1977). It is interesting to note that the legislative
history of section 11 l(e) lends support to the rationale of the state off-the-air-recording cases
discussed in note 91 supra and to the alternative interpretation of Alaska Productions, supra
note 94: "With the one exception provided in subsection (f) and limited by subsection (e), the
section does not cover or permit a cable system, or indeed any person, to tape or otherwise
record a program off-the-air and later to transmit the program from the tape or record to the
public." H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 91 (emphasis added). Again, there must be the combination of
the recordation and the economic exploitation.
97. Sections I1 l(e)(2) and (f), paragraph 2, permit, under the compulsory license system,
cable systems located outside the contiguous forty-eight states, Puerto Rico and to a limited
extent Hawaii, to make recordings off-the-air of all materials to aid its delayed transmission to
its subscribers. This was precisely the fact situation in Alaska Television. Thus, in this limited
sense the cable system could avoid liability for the recording. The negative implications of
sections Il(e) and 112(a) make clear that this limited right to record a television show in a
commercial setting does not extend beyond the geographical limitations of section 1 11(e).
Section 112 permits all transmitting organizations-including cable systems without regard to
geographic location-to make recordings of copyrighted material to aid in transmission. Section
112(a) does not, however, permit recording of motion pictures and other audiovisual works.
Thus, although an Alaska cable system could record television shows broadcast from Washing-
ton state, an Idaho system could not.
98. See note 85 supra.
99. Defendants argue in their Pre-Trial Memorandum 26-31, 41-42, 45-47, that the first
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The Supreme Court has recognized that the technological limitations of
access to the broadcast media require the elevation of the interest of the
viewing and listening public over the interest of those broadcasting. 100 The
question is whether this choice of priorities, which gives the public the
privilege "of converting [broadcast signals] . . . into the sights and sounds
of the program," 10 1 includes the right to memorialize the sights and sounds
on magnetic tape. The basis for the limitation on broadcaster discretion-the
fairness doctrine-lies in the fundamental first amendment presumption that
the "marketplace of ideas" will dialectically produce the truth. 102 Given the
physically limited ability to broadcast views, the artificial device of the
"fairness doctrine" emerged in order to preserve the balance in the market-
place. 103 Because the primary concern is the dissemination of information in
a balanced way, the doctrine imposes a limitation on the "near monopo-
ly''104 of airwaves since it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
10 5
There are several reasons which could justify the extension of the
public interest in the airwaves to limit property rights in copyright. First,
both copyright and rights to broadcast are legislatively created, limited
monopolies-the former in the use and benefit of the tangible expression of
a person's thought; the latter in the utilization of a transmission frequency.
Both stem not from any public policy for the creation of monopolies, but
from practical concerns: the encouragement of useful arts and sciences and
the avoidance of chaos in broadcasting frequencies."°6 An affinity of struc-
ture exists between a copyright and a license to broadcast; when they
become closely associated, as in the Betamax case, it is possible to switch
the limitations on broadcasting onto copyright without structurally damag-
ing either concept.
amendment implications of broadcast and implied consent should permit the memorializing of
broadcasted materials.
100. Compare Red Lion Broadcast Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1967) with Miami Herald Pub.
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
101. 415 U.S. at 408.
102. Red Lion Broadcast Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1967); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
103. "[B]roadcast frequencies are limited and, therefore, they have been necessarily con-
sidered a public trust. Every licensee who is fortunate in obtaining a license is mandated to
operate in the public interest and has assumed the obligation of presenting important public
questions fairly and without bias." S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1959), quoted in
Red Lion Broadcast Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 383 (1967).
104. Friendly, The Campaign to Politicize Broadcasting, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv.
Mar./Apr. 1973 at 9. The fairness doctrine requires the broadcaster to adequately cover issues
of public importance and to fairly reflect differing viewpoints, CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973); Red Lion Broadcast Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1967).
105. Red Lion Broadcast Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1967); see United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
106. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 104 (1973).
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Second, the operation of a Betamax machine appears to promote the
principle underlying the fairness doctrine: the right of the public to be
informed within the context of the "marketplace of ideas."1 0 7 By enabling a
person to memorialize a broadcast which exists only at a given time, it
increases his ability to receive information by freeing him from the prior
limitation of being in front of a television set at a specific time.108
Third, the enforcement of the fairness doctrine through the licensing
process t 9 produces a rationale for the incorporation of the implied consent
theory: broadcast stations are licensed to broadcast only in the public
interest. An important public interest lies in the promotion of the flow of
information. Broadcast stations may not contract to broadcast in contraven-
tion of the promotion of the public interest. Therefore, any license to
broadcast given by a copyright owner must carry the implied qualification
that the broadcast promote the public interest, which includes permitting the
use of Betamax to maximize the information flow.
Although the first amendment has not been asserted as a defense to
actions for infringement in the context of the fairness doctrine, several
courts have rejected first amendment defenses to actions for infringement
largely because copyright in itself places "[n]o restraint. . . on the use of
an idea or concept.""I0 Copyright is a limitation on the use of a form of an
idea: it is a limited monopoly of form. A license to broadcast is also a
limited monopoly of form-a licensed broadcaster has an exclusive right for
a limited time in a limited area to use a frequency to communicate with the
viewing and listening public. But it must be remembered that the grant of a
license to one broadcaster prevents many others from communicating with
the public over radio or television, except as allowed by the discretion of the
licensee l' or by the fairness doctrine. The broadcasting license therefore
limits the ability to communicate with others to the licensee. Assuming that
107. Id. at 112-13; see Pre-Trial Memorandum for Defendant, 26-31; Pre-Trial Memorandum
for Plaintiff, 79-91.
108. It is arguably a long step from politically-oriented information flow (with which the
fairness doctrine is primarily concerned) to the probable use of a Betamax for the recordation
of entertaining programs. However, the Supreme Court appears to be increasingly hesitant to
differentiate political and other forms of speech. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.
Ct. 2691 (1977) (prohibition of the advertising of fees for routine legal services is an unjustifi-
able restraint of free speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (a ban on the advertisement of prices of prescription drugs is an
unjustifiable restraint of free speech). Moreover, the use of Betamax might actually encourage
political discussion-for instance, by recording the Nixon-Frost interviews. Freedom of Video,
supra note 2, at 60, col. 2.
109. Red Lion Broadcast Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1967).
110. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,571 (1973); accord, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
217 (1954); see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct. 2849, 2858 n.13 (1977);
Pre-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff at 79-81.
111. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111, 120 (1973).
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different people have different ideas, the license thus represents a limitation
on the expression of ideas. By licensing the station to broadcast a copyright-
ed work, the owner of a copyright places his limited monopoly of form
within the limited monopoly of expression. The broadcast of a copyrighted
film or show, because it limits the expression of other ideas, necessarily
subjects the copyrighted material to the interests of the public in the recep-
tion of the broadcasts.1 1 2 It should be noted, moreover, that none of the
cases rejecting a first amendment defense involves the recordation of broad-
casted material. 113
However, none of these arguments is persuasive enough to compel a
conceptual leap from the right to hear to the right to memorialize. The
structural affinity of the copyright and broadcast licenses merely makes
crossover conceptually clean; it does not mandate crossover of restrictions.
Further, even if the crossover is made, it seems clear that the scope of the
first amendment restriction implicit in technologically limited access is
limited to the operation of the fairness doctrine.114 The limitation of expres-
sion of ideas inheres in the "broadcast" not in the "use of the copyrighted
material." It stretches the imagination to the breaking point to say that the
fairness doctrine affirms the following argument: because a person with one
112. See notes 91, 94 & 96 supra.
113. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (state statute prohibiting record "piracy"-
the commercial recordation and sale of another's record--does not violate first amendment);
Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978) (first amendment argument rejected when advanced by a weekly
financial newspaper to defend its copying of financial reports of an institutional research
business); United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (pirating of records
onto tapes); Jondora Music Pub. Co. v. Melody Recording, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975) (piracy
of records onto tapes); Robert Stigwood Gp., Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976) (public
performance of copyrighted musical composition in concerts); Walt Disney Prod. v. Air
Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (copying and reproduction of cartoon characters in a
magazine); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(copying of one economic textbook by publishers of another).
However, in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977), a first amendment argument was rejected despite the fact that the
copyrighted item was a children's television show, which was infringed by defendant's
"McDonaldland" television commercials. 562 F.2d at 1171. Defendant did not record plaintiff's
show; the court did not consider the possibility of a limitation on copyright based on the first
amendment-rooted public interest in the airwaves. Nevertheless, it did recognize the "rare"
limitation on copyright of graphic expressions of newsworthy events. Id. at 1171, which was
first suggested in Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1199 (1970). See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
114. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-22, 130-31 (1973) (broadcaster
who must meet public obligation of providing full and fair coverage of public issues not required
to accept editorial advertisements).
BETAMAX 1201
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
television can only watch it on one channel at a time, because there is more
than one channel, because the copyrighted show appears on a channel not
being watched, and because the ideal of the fairness doctrine is an unskewed
"marketplace of ideas," the copyright owner impliedly licenses all viewers
not only to watch or perform in de minimus commercial settings, but also to
memorialize. Must it not also follow that the seller of a television owes a
duty to the buyer to enable him to watch five channels at the same time?
Clearly, this goes too far.
Finally in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. ,' 5 the Su-
preme Court held that the first amendment did not immunize the news media
from a claim based on a state tort law "right of publicity." In that case, a
cameraman from a television station filmed the entire act of Zacchini, who
was a "human cannonball." Zacchini previously had denied permission to
film the act. Noting that the right of publicity promoted the public interest
by giving the performer economic incentives to perform, in a manner similar
to the economic incentives used by copyright law, the court stated: "The
Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring respondent to compen-
sate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege
respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without
liability to the copyright owner." 1 6 Zacchini is analogous support for the
proposition that a television station infringes by broadcasting a copyrighted
work without the owner's permission. Zacchini suggests that the scope of
copyright protection will not be narrowed by the fact that the copyrighted
work is projected over the public airwaves. For the above reasons the
justification for extending the implied consent theory to memorialization is
lacking. The limited scope of first amendment restrictions on copyright, the
limited scope of the fairness doctrine, the Alaska Television case and the
Zacchini case lead to the conclusion that the right to convert broadcast
signals into sights and sounds does not include the right to memorialize
those sights and sounds.
These developments in the right of public performance suggest two
conflicting arguments in the Betamax litigation. On the one hand,
Congress' revival of the distinction between activity that economically
impinges upon the value of a copyright and activity that does not in the
CATV area supports a conclusion that use of Betamax infringes the plain-
tiff's copyrights. Moreover, the implied consent-public interest argument to
the contrary is unpersuasive. On the other hand, the de minimus violation
approach of Aiken strongly suggests that home use of Betamax is not an
infringing act. This suggestion is strengthened by recent development of a
115. 97 S.Ct. 2849 (1977).
116. Id. at 2857 (emphasis added).
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"home use" exception from infringement for the recordation of sound
recordings.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN LIABILITY FOR COPYING PHONOGRAPH RECORDS:
HOME USE AS COMPARED TO FAIR USE
Although Congress groups videotape recordings with motion pictures
in the new Act,117 the close analogy between tape recording records and tape
recording television shows 18 renders comparison of liability for tape
recording records appropriate in considering liability for using Betamax.
Prior to the passage of the Sound Recording Act of 1971,119 phonog-
raph records were not copyrightable1 20 and the copyrights in musical compo-
sitions embodied in records were not violated if the bootleg copier121 paid
royalties pursuant to the compulsory license system. 122 These restrictions on
copyright stemmed, on the one hand, from a Supreme Court definition of
copy that required visual comprehensibility 123 and, on the other hand, from
a well-grounded fear that a monopoly in the manufacture of records would
develop. 1
24
A. The Sound Recording Act and Home Use.
Congress passed the Sound Recording Act to undercut the privileged
position of record and tape pirates, 25 who would purchase an album, record
copies of it, pay the compulsory license fees, and undersell the legitimate
record manufacturer who had to pay the musicians and the technicians for
the creation of the sound recording. The concern was that the reproducer
117. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977):
'Audiovisual works' are works that consist of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projec-
tors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the
works are embodied . . . . '[M]otion pictures' are audiovisual works.
118. See notes 199-207 infra and accompanying text.
119. Pub. L. No. 92-140, § l(a), 85 Stat. 391 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § l(f) (Supp. V 1975)).
120. E.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records, Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
121. Although the cases which relied on Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926
(W.D.N.Y. 1912) as discussed in text accompanying notes 129-33 infra, held that recording a
record (as opposed to hiring a band and having it play the tune which is then recorded) will not
bring the recorder within the compulsory license provisions, it was widely thought that sound
pirates would be so immunized. H.R. REP. No. 487 at 2; see Nimmer, Photocopying and Record
Piracy: Of Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1052 (1975).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 11(e) (1970) (old act) provides, generally, that if the owner of copyrighted
music permits it to be recorded on a record, anyone can make "similar use" of the music upon
the paying of two cents royalty per song per record to the copyright owner.
123. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
124. H.R. REP. No. 487 at 6; Second Supplementary Report, c.9 at 4.
125. H.R. REP. No. 487 at 2.
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could exploit a sound recording 'without contributing to its creation. 126
Section 1 (f) gave to the manufacturers of sound recordings copyright protec-
tion against duplicate recordings that are fixed after February 15, 1972.127
This limited copyrightability of sound recordings, which includes the right
to duplicate the sound recording, to prepare a derivative work (but only to
the extent that the actual sounds embodied in the sound recording are
rearranged), and to distribute the phonorecords to the public by sale, lease,
rental or loan, is continued in section 114 of the new Act.
Sound recordings fixed prior to 1972 are not copyrightable. 128 How-
ever, copyright owners of such musical compositions are not left helpless in
the event that a tape pirate records their songs. A long dormant case,
Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co. ,129 has been revived by the courts to
allow musical copyright owners to sue for infringement if a tape pirate
duplicates a record and attempts to tender the compulsory licensee fee. In
Aeolian, a record company sued a competitor for infringement of section
1(c), alleging that defendant duplicated Aeolian's records. Since the defend-
ant in that case did copy plaintiff's record and subsequently tendered to the
copyright owner the compulsory license royalty, the question remaining was
whether defendant, by copying plaintiff's record, was making a "similar
use of the copyrighted work," which would enable defendant to bring
himself within the operation of the compulsory license, section l(e). The
court held that similar use does not include exact duplication of the prior
record.
The provision of the statute (Section I (e)) that "any other person may
make similar use of the copyrighted work" becomes automatically
126. "The pirating of records and tapes is not only depriving legitimate manufacturers of
substantial income, but of equal importance is denying performing artists and musicians of
royalties and contributions to pensions and welfare funds .... Id. Applying the doctrines of
unfair competition or misappropriation, several state courts have enjoined record pirates. See,
e.g., Capital Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798, cert. denied, 398
U.S. 960 (1970); Capital Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 III. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970);
NBC, Inc. v. Nance, 506 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); CBS, Inc. v. Melody Recording Co.,
124 N.J. Super. 322, 306 A.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Capital Records Inc. v. Greatest Records,
Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Liberty/VA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape
Corp., 11 N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 278 N.C. 702, 181
S.E.2d 600 (1971); CBS, Inc. v. Custom Recording Co., 258 S.C. 465, 189 S.E.2d 305, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972); Mercury Record Productions v. Economic Consultants, Inc,, 64
Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705 (1974), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 914 (1975).
127. The section has survived constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, United
States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977), and violation of
due process, United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (W.D. Okla. 1974). For examples
of criminal convictions for record piracy under the amendment, see United States v. Maliconte,
531 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1975) and United States v. Blanton, 531 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1975).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 1(f) (Supp, V 1977); see 17 U.S.C.A. § 115(a)(1) (West 1977) (new act).
129. 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912); see also Standard Music Roll Co. v. F.A. Mills, Inc., 241
F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917).
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operative by the grant of the license; but the subsequent user does not
thereby secure the right to copy the . . . records. He cannot avail
himself of the skill and labor of the original manufacturer of the...
record by copying or duplicating the same, but must resort to the
copyrighted composition or sheet music, and not pirate the work of a
competitor .... 130
Therefore, the bootlegger was an infringer, not a licensee.
The holding in Aeolian, that a pirate who duplicates a licensed sound
recording is liable for infringement because duplication of a record is not
"similar use" of the copyrighted work, was first brought back to life in the
wake of the Sound Recording Act of 1971 in Duchess Music Corp. v.
Stern. 131 The decision in Duchess, which allows for both civil and criminal
actions against tape pirates duplicating sound recordings fixed both before
and after 1972, is based on an analysis similar to that in Aeolian and has
gained rapid acceptance among courts, 132 if not among commentators.1 33
Section 115 of the new Act codifies the basis for liability in Duchess;134
thus, both the record manufacturer and the composer may hold copyrights
that are infringed by duplication of a sound recording, and the federal
government may pursue criminal sanctions if the recording is done willfully
and for profit.135
In spite of this case law, the legislative history of the 1971 Act
indicates that home recording of a copyrighted record may not be an
infringement. In its report on the Sound Recording Act of 1971, the House
Committee on the Judiciary wrote:
Specifically, it is not the intention of the Committee to restrain the home
recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded per-
130. 196 F. at 927. The court also held, mistakenly, that the owner of the musical copyright
could transfer to the licensee record manufacturer the copyright owner's exclusive right to
manufacture records. Thus, the record manufacturer was the plaintiff, not the musical copy-
right owner.
131. 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
132. See, e.g., Fame Pub. Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); Jondora Music Pub. Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado
Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975); Heilman v.
Bell, 434 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Wis. 1977); International Tape Dist., Ltd. v. Levi, 188 U.S.P.Q.
539 (D.D.C. 1975); E-C Tapes, Inc. v. Kelly, 412 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. II1. 1975); Fame Pub. Co.
v. S & S Distributors, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
133. M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 108.4621; Nimmer, Photocopying and Record Piracy,
supra note 121; see Commission on Revision of the Federal Court System, Recommendations
for Change, Appendix B, reprinted at 67 F.R.D. 281, 294-95 (1975).
134. 17 U.S.C.A. § 115(a)(1) (West 1977). The House Report states: "[A) person is not
entitled to a compulsory license of copyrighted musical works for the purpose of making an
unauthorized duplication of a musical sound recording. H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 108; see
Second Supplementary Report, c.9 at 37.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1970); 17 U.S.C.A. § 506 (West 1977) (new act).
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formances, where the home recording is for private use and with no
purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it.
This practice is common and unrestrained today, and the record pro-
ducers and peiformers would be in no different position from that of
the owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the past
20 years. 136
It has been argued that since the Judiciary Committee, in light of
Duchess, "misconstrued" the prior state of the law as to the availability of a
remedy for owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions, the
"home use exception" to infringement should be rejected. 137 This argument
misses the mark. As suggested above, the courts in Duchess and its progeny
acted in the era of the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, and it seems
likely that the courts were subtly influenced by the new congressional
attitude toward record piracy. Furthermore, even if Congress did miscon-
strue prior law, that is entirely beside the point. The Judiciary Committee
was indicating Congress' intent in enacting new law;138 the scope of the new
law was suggested by a comparison to the old law. That the comparison was
not true because of a misconception of the state of the old law does not affect
the scope of the new law. The misconception is still available for
comparison.
136. H.R. REP. No. 487 at 7 (emphasis added). The sole purpose of the sound recording
amendment was to make "record piracy," which combines duplication with commercial exploi-
tation, illegal. During the Senate's deliberation on the amendment, Senator McClellan said:
The recent rapid increase in the unauthorized commercial duplication of legitimate
recordings has become a serious problem both in this country and abroad. The
widespread availability of inexpensive equipment has encouraged extensive commer-
cial pirating of recordings and tapes . . . . By granting a limited copyright in sound
recordings this legislation will make a major contribution to the suppression of this
unethical and unfair business competition.
117 CONG. REC. 12763 (1971).
Mr. Kastenmeier responded to questions from the floor:
Mr. Kazen: Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copyrighted material that
is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
Mr. Kastenmeier: Yes.
Mr. Kazen: In other words, if your child were to record off of a program which
comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used it for her
own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not be
included under the penalties of this bill?
Mr. Kastenmeier: This is not included in the bill. . . . On page 7 of the report, under
'Home Recordings,' Members will note that under the bill the same
practice which prevails today is called for; namely, this is con-
sidered both presently and under the proposed law to be fair use.
The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is made
clear in the report.
117 CONG. REC. 34748-49 (1971) (emphases added). See also 117 CONG. REc. 34748 (remarks of
Rep. Kastenmeier), 34749 (remarks of Rep. Railsback) (1971); Pre-Trial Memorandum for
Defendant at 9-25.
137. Pre-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff at 64-67.
138. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 12764 (1971) (remarks of Senator Hart): "Its purpose is to
prevent record 'piracy,' both the illegal form of piracy, . . . and legal piracy, where all
statutory liabilities are met."
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Still, there is no home recording exception on the face of section
1(f). 3 9 Nor does the new Act contain an explicit exception for home
recording, as it does for limited duplication of copyrighted materials by
libraries and archives in section 107.14° Nonetheless, two courts have
adopted-one by dicta, one by implication-the "home use exception."
The Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California 141 rejected a claim that
federal copyright law preempted a California record piracy statute. In its
discussion of the workings of the copyright clause, the court said in dicta:
"An author who possesses an unlimited copyright may preclude others from
copying his creation for commercial purposes without permission. In other
words, to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic
creation, Congress may guarantee to authors and inventors a reward in the
form of control over the sale and commercial use of copies of their
works." 142 The Court seems to be suggesting that the presence or absence of
commercial purposes is vital in determining infringement. Whether this is
true as to infringement per se is doubtful for the simple reason that the
statutes do not make commercial purpose an explicit element of infringe-
ment. 143 But as noted above, the congressional intent (with which the Court
seems to be agreeing in this record piracy case) concerning liability for the
recording of records, off the air, and audio tapes (and, by analogy, audio-
visual tapes) requires that commercial purpose be considered."4
In Electra Records v. Gem Electronic Distributors, Inc., 145 Gem
Electronics installed "Make-A-Tape" machines in its record stores. The
machine was capable of reproducing on a blank tape an entire recorded tape
in two minutes. Gem would sell blank tapes to a customer, who would select
a tape from an inventory which the store kept for that purpose, deposit fifty
cents into the "Make-A-Tape" machine and record the store's tape. Elec-
tra's copyrighted sound recordings were among those loaned from the
store's "library." The court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction. Relying in part on an unreported decision from the Southern
139. Professor Nimmer suggests that this means there is no home use exception. M.
NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 109.212. However, it seems clear that legislative intent can prevail
over the actual language used in a statute. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 447
(1932).
140. With respect to the use of copyrighted materials for nonprofit purposes, the bill in
the judgment of the committee provides a careful structure [sic] balance between the
legitimate rights of the creators, and the reasonable needs of users. Particular attention
has been given to the concerns of classroom teachers and public libraries.
122 CONG. REC. 1545 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1976) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
141. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
142. Id. at 555; see also Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
143. See Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
144. The rationale for this consideration is discussed in notes 160-63 infra.
145. 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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District of Ohio,' 46 the court rejected Gem's attempt to distinguish its
actions from ordinary tape piracy by arguing that the duplication was
individual rather than en masse and that the customers, not Gem, did the
actual recording.147 Gem tried to analogize the use of its "Make-A-Tape"
machine to that of a photocopy machine in a library or to a home recording,
to which Congress "clearly did not intend to extend coverage of the bill
''148
The court implicitly recognized the home recording exception as a
defense to copyright infringement by making a principled argument why it
should not apply to the facts before the court. 149 The theoretical underpin-
ning of the home use exception is suggested by the court's reasons for
rejecting the tendered analogies. Gem's recordings and library photocopy-
ing were dissimilar because: (1) photocopies usually duplicate only a por-
tion of the book, compared to the recording of entire tapes; (2) time and
expense discourage photographing entire books, while "Make-A-Tape"
makes it easy and inexpensive to duplicate; (3) photocopies are inferior and
less desirable than the original, while the new tapes were as good as the old;
and (4) Gem was commercially motivated, while the librarians are not. 150
The home use analogy was rejected because of Gem's commercial exploita-
tion and because Gem's actions constituted "mass piracy on a custom
basis." 1 51
B. Home Use: Refracted Fair Use.
1. Traditional fair use. The reasons given by the Electra court for
rejecting the photocopy analogy are based on more or less orthodox "fair
use" grounds; the home use analogy was not an orthodox fair use argument.
Fair use'52 is an equitable rule of reason that classifies some copying as
"permitted copying of copyrighted material.' '153 Beyond this unhelpful
designation, it is "so flexible as virtually to defy definition."' 5 4 According
146. CBS, Inc. v. Commercial Music Service Co., Civil Action 73-134 (S.D. Ohio, May 8,
1973).
147. 360 F. Supp. at 824.
148. Id.
149. In lending the copyrighted sound recording to the customers without charge, in
selling the less costly blank tape from which the spurious but exact copy may be made,
and in providing the equipment whereby it may be speedily done at minimal cost,
defendants are engaging in mass piracy on a custom basis. To view this activity as a
form of 'homerecording' would stretch-imagination to the snapping point.
Id. at 824-25.
150. Id. at 824.
151. Id. at 824-25 (emphasis added).
152. A detailed discussion of fair use is beyond the scope of this Comment. It is examined
only as general background in the analysis of home use.
153. Needham, supra note 32, at 79.
154. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (SD.N.Y. 1968); see H.R.
REP. No. 1476 at 66.
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to Nimmer, the central question in applying fair use is whether the copying
will tend to detrimentally affect the marketability of the copyright owner's
work-essentially whether the copy will serve the same function as the
original.155 Nonetheless, a common approach to fair use is to consider
several factors pertaining to its applicability. 156 According to the recent
legislative recognition of fair use in section 107 of the new Act, the most
significant factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The traditional approach to fair use, although it articulates a list of
factors to be considered, emphasizes the final factor-detrimental impact on
the value of the property in copyright. 157 Using this approach, one has little
difficulty in concluding that home use is not fair use.158 The cumulative
impact of all home uses will result in decreased profitability of reruns. The
copying is of the entire work. The nature of the work is not scientific or
scholarly. Indeed, the factors listed by the court in the Electra case in
concluding that "Make-A-Tape" was not analogous to library photocopy-
ing would also distinguish home use from the library photocopying: while
the lack of commercial motivation is common to both the home use and the
library photocopying, home use of a Betamax could make a good quality
recording of the entire copyrighted work at relatively little expense.
2. An alternative view of fair use. The peculiar legislative genesis
of home use and its character as a de minimus violation, require that one
examine all and not just one of the multiple factors of fair use. 159 Extrapola-
155. M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 145, at 646-47; see Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061,
1070 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 727 (1978); Wainwright See., Inc. v. Wall St.
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978).
156. See, e.g., Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 53 IowA L. REV.
832 (1968); Needham, supra note 32, at 80-95.
157. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 24-25 (House Comm. Print 1961);
Holland, The Audiovisual Package: Handle With Care, 22 BULL. CR. SOC. 104, 123 (1974).
158. M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 109.212; Holland, supra note 157, at 124-25; Meyer,
supra note 10, at 37-38.
159. It is clear the Congress did not feel bound to any particular concept of fair use: "The
bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change . . . . [T]he courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations." H.R.
REP. No. 1476 at 66.
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tion from the legislative history suggests a five factor test for home use: (1)
whether the recording was commercially motivated; (2) whether the
recording, in itself, impairs the value of the copyright; (3) whether there are
multiple recordings; (4) whether recording was for personal use or pleasure;
and (5) whether the method of recording was no more sophisticated than
ordinary home equipment.
The traditional focus on the cumulative economic impact of Betamax
ignores a significant legislative clarification of the "first test" of orthodox
fair use: the purpose and character of the use. Earlier legislative formula-
tions of the factors of fair use referred simply to "the nature and the
character of the use." 160 The House Committee on the Judiciary added the
extra words in "an express recognition that, as under present law, the
commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclusive with
respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other factors in
fair use decisions." 161 The commercial motive aspect of fair use is accorded
too little weight under the traditional approach; 162 to use the traditional
A recent utilization of the multiple factor test is found in Encyclopaedia Britannica Ed. Corp.
v.Crooks, No. 77-560 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1978). Defendant was a non-profit corporation
providing educational services to public schools in Erie County, New York. One of the services
was making audiovisual tapes from televised educational films and distributing copies of the
master copy to teachers from over 100 schools on request. Plaintiffs owned copyrights in
several of the copied films. In its copying service, defendant used equipment worth one-half
million dollars, employed a staff of five to eight full-time persons, and made as many as 10,000
tapes for distribution per year. The court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction
because defendant's videocopying "would seem to constitute a blatant violation" of plaintiff's
copyrights and because, on the basis of evidence then available, defendant's use was not
"fair." Although defendant's "purpose and character" of the use was educational and not
commercially motivated, the other three factors of fair use dominated. The court had to
presume irreparable injury; evidence suggested that defendant's videocopying did injure plain-
tiff's market for educational films. Defendant copied entire films and recopied them as many
time as requested. The copying was not occasional or informal. Defendant engaged in "a highly
organized and systematic program for reproducing videotapes on a massive scale." Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the substantiality of the copying and the detrimental impact
were sufficient to deny the applicability of fair use.
160. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975); see Holland, supra note 157, at 123;
Meyer, supra note 10, at 37.
161. H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 66; accord, Second Supplementary Report, c.2 at 28
("although the commercial or nonprofit character of a use is not necessarily conclusive with
respect to fair use, in combination with other factors it can and should weigh heavily in fair use
decisions").
162. Authorities recognizing the role of commercial motive include: Wainwright Sec. Inc. v.
Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1977) (dicta), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 730
(1978); Encyclopaedia Britannica Ed. Corp. v. Crooks, No. 77-560 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1978);
Loew's Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 176 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v.
Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. CBS, Inc.
v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Conde Nast Publications v. Vogue School of Fashion
Modeling, 105 F. Supp. 325, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Meyers
Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938); see Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293
F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Needham, supra note 32, at 86, 90, 92-93; Yankwich, What
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approach in a situation where the non-commercial motive plays an important
role appears anomalous. 163 Home use of a Betamax meets this commercial
motive test.
Moreover, this congressional highlighting of commercial motive in the
fair use equation, when coupled with the expression of congressional intent
to exempt home recording of copyrighted sound recordings from infringe-
ment liability, 164 requires a reformulation of the scope of the fourth factor:
economic impact on the copyright. The reformulation appears necessary
because the traditional test measures the cumulative economic impact on the
property in copyright 165 by asking whether the copies tend to replace the
copyrighted work. 166 Under this approach, copying on machines capable of
reproducing the entire copyrighted work for personal use constitutes in-
fringement because of the cumulative impact of all such uses. This result is
clearly not intended by Congress in creating the home use exemption. The
alteration of the economic impact factor necessary to harmonize it with
Congress' intent narrows the perspective of economic impact from the
is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 209 (1954). Contra, Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1964); see Wihtol v.
Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 22 (D.
Ariz. 1975); Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
163. The cases that reject commercial motive as an element of fair use fall into one of two
groups. First, some cases hold that the total copying of a work for any purpose cannot be a fair
use. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1962); Robert Stigwood Gp., Ltd. v. O'Reilly,
346 F. Supp. 376, 384-85 (D. Conn. 1972). The rationale of these cases is questionable in light of
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), where the Court of Claims held that the photocopying of
entire articles in medical journals for use of researchers was fair use. Id. at 1362. "There is, in
short, no inflexible rule excluding an entire copyrighted work from the area of 'fair use.'" Id.
at 1353. The holding clearly indicates that copying an entire work does not preclude fair use.
See Comment, supra note 21, at 102. But see Encyclopaedia Britannica Ed. Corp. v. Crooks,
No. 77-560 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1978). The court's analysis in Williams & Wilkins has been
rather severely criticized, see, e.g., M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 145. The second group of
cases apply fair use despite the existence of commercial motive. Rosemont Enter., Inc., v.
Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Berlin
v. E-C Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). This
application of fair use doesnot contradict the consideration of commercial motive, but merely
points out that the absence of commercial motive is not a necessary condition for operation of
the doctrine. Cases failing to recognize .commercial motives in fair use perhaps make the
unjustified deduction that since intent to infringe is irrelevant, M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at §
148, all intent is irrelevant, see, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
At any rate, they fail to accord significance to a factor that obviously relates directly to the
commercial incentive rationale of copyright law. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1908).
164. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
165. S. REP. No. 473, supra note 160, at 65; M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 146, at 646.
166. Wainwright Sec. Co. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1977)
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978); Berlin v. E-C Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
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cumulative to the individual impact upon the copyright. 167 The inquiry,
then, is whether the individual's copying has an inappreciable economic
impact upon the value of the copyright. 168
This narrowing of perspective is buttressed by two previously dis-
cussed developments. First, examination of individual impact is suggested
by the de minimus violation theory in Aiken and the codification of that
result in the new Act.169 Both Aiken and section 110(5) permit public
performance of the copyrighted material provided that it is done in a small
commercial establishment with home equipment. The result of removing
liability in such a situation is a significant reduction in the value of the
copyright; the necessity for obtaining performance licenses disappears in
thousands of instances. In addition, the Aiken theory of practical unenfor-
ceability makes the most sense when understood to connote insignificance
of individuaI impact. 170 Second, the reasoning in the Electra decision
suggests the necessity of associating individual economic impact with
commercial motive in the home use context. The court distinguished
"Make-A-Tape" from home use for two reasons: because Gem had a
commercial motive and because such copying constituted "mass piracy on a
custom basis." 171 The mass piracy holding would appear to permit the
167. See Needham, supra note 32. Although it is not entirely clear from reading Needham,
his definition of "de minimis" appears to be the one adopted here. Considering an individual
impact would not render the factor meaningless. See Encylcopaedia Britannica Ed. Corp. v.
Crooks, No. 77-560 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1978) (corporation made up to 10,000 audiovisual
copies per year).
168. See cases cited in note 175 infra. In enacting the new copyright act, Congress intended
to "avoid exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field . H. " R.
REP. No. 1476 at 51. Instead of subordinating all other interests to the promotion of arts and
sciences, Congress has sought to create a delicate balance between the interests promoted and
the interests impinged. Compare this approach with the one finally adopted in congressional
efforts to ease the Great Depression of the 1930's. In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942),
the Court, recognizing the necessarily broad scope of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
(AAA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1976), found that wheat grown for home consumption was
within congressional regulatory authority under the commerce clause. The AAA had the clear
intent of buffering domestic wheat prices in the United States from the extreme fluctuation of
prices resulting from surpluses and shortages. 317 U.S. at 115, 126. For the individual home
consumer, the principle of de minimus use was not allowed. Congress was going as far as it
could under the commerce clause. The 1976 Copyright Act does not appear to go as far as the
AAA did.
169. See notes 54-67 supra and accompanying text.
170. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
171. 360 F. Supp. at 825. It should be remembered that Gem argued that the presence of
"Make-A-Tape" machines in its stores was dissimilar from the operation of the run-of-the-mill
tape pirate because the duplication was accomplished individually and was actually performed
by the customers, not by Gem. See note 147 supra and accompanying text. If the court had
accepted this argument, Gem's position would have been wholly analogous to Sony's position
of merely providing individuals the capacity to record. However, the court rejected this
argument. The effect of Gem's operation was identical to the effect of an ordinary tape pirate:
the public was able to purchase tape recordings at a low price because payments of copyright
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inverse of mass recording-singular recordings. 172 However, if the or-
thodox economic impact approach were utilized, even the singular recording
in the home without commercial intent would not constitute fair use because
such recording, when considered as a class, would still have a detrimental
impact upon the value of the copyright. Therefore, the individual approach
to economic impact seems to be an unstated premise of the Electra court's
recognition of the home use defense.
The home use exception differs from orthodox "fair use" also in
restricting the amount of copying done. It is possible to have fair use and
large amounts of copying, 173 but the "mass piracy" holding in Electra
precludes the idea of grand scale copying under the home use exception.
Thus, the House Committee on the Judiciary suggests a bar on multiple
copies by requiring that a home use have "no purpose of reproducing or
otherwise commercially capitalizing on it." 174 The use must be "such, and
such only, as will not cause substantial injury to the . . . [copyright
owner]." 175 And, to narrow the permissible uses even further, the use must
not be multiple duplication of the copyrighted work. This approach does not
focus on whether the copies or the copy are used for the same purpose, but
on whether a single copy 176 of a copyrighted work can be said to cause
injury to the copyrighted work. 17 7
A fourth test of home use is whether the recording is done for personal
use. This test is the logical corollary to the commercial motivation require-
royalties or performers' fees were not made. The only difference, then, between Gem and the
ordinary tape pirate was that Gem had to keep a much smaller inventory of tape recordings than
the ordinary pirate in order to satisfy customer demands. To hold that Gem was not a tape
pirate in such circumstances would be to exalt form over substance.
Of course, labeling Gem a pirate does not require labeling Sony a pirate. Although Sony is
certainly commercially motivated, the effect of its actions is to sell to the public both the blank
tapes and the machines to use them on. It is not possible to say in Sony's situation-as it must
be said in Gem's situation-that Sony is the constructive copier of the copyrighted programs.
172. See notes 173-77 infra and accompanying text.
173. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973). But see
Encyclopaedia Britannica Ed. Corp. v. Crooks, No. 77-560 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1978).
174. H.R. REP. No. 487 at 7 (emphasis added).
175. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136); accord, Ginn &
Co. v. Apollo Pub. Co., 215 F. 772, 778 (E.D. Pa. 1914); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F.
359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); see Runge v. Lee, 441 F.2d 579, 581 (9th Cir. 1971).
176. See generally Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937), where
the court states that "wholesale" (for example, multiple) copying cannot be fair use.
177. "Isolated instances of minor infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the
aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." S. REP. No. 473, supra note
160, at 65. The impact of this statement is modified by the context in which it is made. The
discussion centered on the economic impingement factor and its interrelation with the other
factors. It was prefaced by the remark: "With certain special exceptions (use in parodies or as
evidence in court proceedings might be examples) a use that supplants any part of the normal
market for a copyrighted work would ordinarily be considered infringement." The argument
here, of course, is that home use is such an exception.
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ment and to the Aiken de minimus analysis. Moreover, this requirement
appears in the case law to a limited extent. 178 The Court of Claims in
Williams & Wilkins distinguished commercial uses and the making of a
single copy for individual, personal or restricted use. 179 If the purpose of the
copying is personal use, the copying is "fair"--even if of an entire arti-
cle. 180 Legislative history also provides some support for this requirement.
In the legislative history of the Sound Recording Act of 1971, copying for
personal use and pleasure meshed with the very concept of home use. 181
However, in its discussion of the permissibility of recording educational
television broadcasts off-the-air by educational institutions, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary posited that such institutional recording could
never be motivated by mere convenience and still constitute fair use. 182
These differing legislative expressions appear irreconcilable. The question
is, then, which context is more analogous to the Betamax situation-
individual home audio tape recording or institutional audiovisual tape
recording? 183 By anticipating home audio-visual recording, the Register of
Copyrights provides the answer. "New technical devices will probably
make it practical in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in the
home. We do not believe the private use of such a reproduction can or
should be precluded by copyright." 184
A fifth factor-that the recording equipment is at an ordinary, home
level of sophistication-derives, sensibly, from the difference between
home recording and piracy. It receives further justification from the devel-
178. Prior to Williams & Wilkins, the case law apparently had not touched on the subject of
private or personal use. W. NASRI, CRISIS IN COPYRIGHT 31 (1976); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, STUDY 14, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. II (Comm. Print 1960). However, in the context of scholarly copying of
copyrighted materials, several commentators have asserted that private use is not an infringing
use. Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, in 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT SYMP. No. 6 at 43, 58
(1955); Shaw, Publication and Distribution of Scientific Literature, 17 C. & RESEARCH LIB.
293, 301 (1956).
179. 487 F.2d at 1353 n.12.
180. See id. at 1350, 1353; cf. Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 503 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (there should be no relief
granted for technical infringements done purely for the infringer's own pleasure); Fritch, supra
note 19, at 117-18, 37 S. CAL. L. REV. at 235 (courts will be loathe to reach the harsh result of
foreclosing private taping off-the-air for noncommercial purposes).
181. See note 136 supra.
182. S. REP. No. 473, supra note 160, at 66.
183. See text accompanying notes 199-207 infra.
184. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 157, at 30 (emphasis added). See also U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 178, STUDY 16 at 117 & 118, where the author considered it
conceivable that a court would use fair use to hold that a purely private exhibition of a motion
picture would not violate the right of performance and where he labeled the extension of the
right of performance to private exhibitions a "questionable restraint."
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opments in the right of public performance. The Supreme Court, through its
decisions in Teleprompter, Fortnightly and Aiken, evolved a definition of
"performance" that permitted all sorts of activities to be classified as
noninfringing. In response to Fortnightly and Teleprompter, Congress cut
back allowable "performance" along lines following economic impinge-
ment. In response to Aiken, Congress ignored the significant detrimental
economic impact upon the copyrights caused by removing the capacity to
license the small commercial establishment for public performance.' 85
Congress recognized a judicially-created exception to the right to perform
by providing that unsophisticated performances in a small commercial
establishment would not be considered infringement. 86 The outer limit of
the congressionally recognized de minimus violation was a small commer-
cial establishment using a home receiver and four ordinary speakers. 87
Except for the commercial nature of the performance, which would be
excluded by the non-commercial motive factor, 18 the facts and holding of
Aiken, especially the emphasis on ordinary home equipment, are fully
applicable to the home use situation.
3. Possible objections to a home use exception. There are several
arguments against recognizing a home use exception and against applying it
to audiovisual recording. First, the basic difference between civil and
criminal infringement is that criminal infringement requires willful infringe-
ment for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain
while civil infringement does not. 89 If home use exempts some not-for-
profit copying, it appears to reduce the scope of civil infringement to that of
criminal infringement: commercially motivated copying. But home use does
not destroy the statutory distinction between the scope of civil and criminal
185. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
186. 17 U.S.C.A. § 110(5) (West 1977) (new act). The rationale of the exemption as ar-
ticulated by the Register of Copyrights is:
[T]o make clear that it is not an infringement of copyright merely to turn on, in a public
place, an ordinary radio or television receiving apparatus of a type commonly sold to
members of the public for private use. This exception would apply for the most part to
the incidental entertainment of small public audiences (patrons in a bar, customers
getting a shoeshine, patients waiting in a doctor's office, etc.). It is not intended to
exempt larger establishments, such as supermarkets, bus stations, factories, etc., in
which broadcasts are not merely received in the usual manner of a private reception,
but are transmitted to substantial audiences by means of a receiving system connected
with a number of loudspeakers spread over a wide area. The exemption would also not
apply in any case where the public is charged directly to see or hear the broadcast.
Second Supplementary Report, c.4 at 5 (quoting from a 1965 Report of the Register concerning
a prior legislative formulation of the exemption).
187. H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 87. Compare Encyclopaedia Britannica Ed. Corp. v. Crooks,
No. 77-560 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1978) (equipment worth one-half million dollars).
188. See notes 136, 160-63 supra and accompanying text.
189. Compare 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) (West 1977) (civil infringements, new act) with 17
U.S.C. § 104 (1970) (criminal infringement, old act) and 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1977)
(criminal infringement, new act).
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infringement. Not all nonprofit copying can claim the home use exemption;
such copying must also meet the other four criteria. Thus, nonprofit civil
infringements are conceivable. Furthermore, the central distinction between
home use and criminal infringement is that criminal infringement requires
willfulness, which is irrelevant to home and fair use. In Conde Nast
Publications v. Vogue School of Fashion Modelling, Inc. ,190 an action was
brought for unfair use of a trade name and for infringement of copyright.
Defendant's name was "inspired" by Conde Nast's Vogue magazine. One
of the alleged copyright infringements involved defendant's use of repro-
ductions of the front covers of Vogue magazines on defendant's promotional
literature. Defendant did not realize that the magazine covers were copy-
righted, yet the court concluded there was a civil infringement. "Although
the defendants may have lacked the intention to deliberately infringe, the
purpose of the copying was to promote their business. . . .This is exactly
the prohibition which limits the privilege granted by the 'fair use' theory
.... "191 Here, then, is a situation where there can be neither criminal
infringement nor applicational home use. In short, the scope of criminal and
civil infringement remains distinct.
Second, it could be urged that the new law, in both its legislative
history and its explicit language, provides no support for a continuation of
the home recording exception created in the Sound Recording Act of 1971.
Indeed, the legislative history pertaining to section 114 (exclusive rights in
sound recordings) is cursory.192 In all probability, this reflects a recognition
that section 114 closely tracks section 1(f) of the old Act. The Register of
Copyrights, after noting that the Sound Recording Act of 1971 had been
enacted in response to "the extraordinary explosion of tape piracy," and
that it had been made permanent in 1974, implied that tape piracy was not an
issue considered in the passing of the revision act in 1976.193 The reason for
enacting the 1974 amendment 94 making the Sound Recording Act perma-
neht, according to the House Committee on the Judiciary, was the unlikeli-
hood that a Senate general revision bill (which contained, in material
aspects, section 114 of the new act)195 would pass the House.196 The general
bill would provide the same protection to sound recording as afforded by
making section l(f) permanent. Congress considered it necessary to make
190. 105 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
191. Id. at 333.
192. H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 106-07; S. REP. No. 473, supra note 160, at 87-88.
193. Second Supplementary Report, c.8 at 9-10.
194. Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 101, 88 Stat. 1873 (codified at note to 17 U.S.C. § I (Supp. V
1975)).
195. S. REP. No. 1035, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974). The Senate version also included a
compulsory license provision for public performance of sound recordings. Id. at 17.
196. H.R. REP. No. 1389, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
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section l(f) permanent because a lapse would trigger an increase in piracy.
Thus, "[t]he perpetration of protection without lapse cannot await enact-
ment of the revision bill." 1 97 Because section 114 of the new Act essentially
tracks section l(f) of the old Act, the legislative history of section l(f) is
equally applicable to the new Act. Consequently, the home use exception
explicated in the legislative history of the Sound Recording Act of 1971 (and
implicit in the definition of "piracy") is equally applicable to at least the
sound recording provisons of the new Act. 198
The most serious doubts as to the applicability of the home use
exception to a home user of Betamax are raised by questioning the analogy
between audio tape recording and audiovisual recording. Section 101 of the
new Act associated audiovisual recording with motion picures, 199 as distin-
guished from phonorecords, which are material objects in which sounds,
perceivable directly or with a machine (other than sound accompanying an
audiovisual work) are fixed. By definition, then, an audiovisual tape is a
motion picture; an audio tape is a phonorecord. The authorities agree that
audiovisual tapes should be classified with motion pictures. 200 The defini-
tion makes a difference: the limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright-
ed motion pictures, section 102(6), are not nearly as thorough as those on
section 102(7) sound recordings. 20 1
Making an audiovisual tape of a television show and making an audio
tape are definitionally different acts. Yet several similarities suggest the
appropriateness of associating the two. First, the exclusive right to repro-
duce sound recordings is limited to the sounds already fixed in an existing
sound recording and does not extend to the right to make sound recordings
of the same song in another version.20 2 Beyond this and the express limita-
tions on sound recordings,20 3 the copyright in sound recordings is just as
exclusive as that in audiovisual works. It is within this area of exclusivity
that the equitable doctrines of fair and home use operate. 0 4 It is from the
exclusive right to record sound recordings that home use exempts audio tape
recorders. "Exclusive" can mean no more for audiovisual works than for
sound recordings, and the Register of Copyrights has expressed concern for
197. Id. at 4.
198. It could be argued that the specific statutory exemptions in section 108 for certain
copying done in libraries and elsewhere provides, by negative implication, that home use not be
an exemption. However, home use is an aspect of fair use, and the provisions in 108 and other
express limitations do not affect the scope of fair use. S. REP. No. 473, supra note 160, at 67.
199. See note 117 supra.
200. See, e.g., M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 116.
201. Compare 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 114-115 (West 1977) (new act) with id. §§ 111 & 112.
202. See notes 122-28 supra and accompanying text.
203. See note 201 supra.
204. CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 35 (1973).
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protecting users of home audiovisual equipment similar to that expressed by
Congress for home users of audio equipment. 20 It is just as much an
infringement to duplicate a copyrighted phonorecord2°6 as it is to make a
copy of a movie.20 7 Further, there is no difference between the acts neces-
sary to copy records and motion pictures. In both instances, the person
purchases the recording machine and attaches it to another device in his
home-a television, a phonograph or a radio receiver. He uses magnetic
tapes to memorialize all or part of a television or radio broadcast or the
contents of a recording. His intent is the same; his acts are the same; the
result is the same-a magnetic tape copy that can be played at his pleasure.
There may be a definitional difference between making a copy of a movie on
an audiovisual recorder and making a copy of a sound recording on an audio
recorder, yet there is no difference in fact.
V. CONCLUSION
Under general principles of infringement and under the traditional
application of the fair use doctrine, Sony and the home user appear to
infringe Universal's and Walt Disney's copyrights. The congressional re-
sponse to the CATV decisions also suggests this conclusion. However, a
refracted form of fair use-home use-has sufficient grounding in legisla-
tive history and case law to suggest a different result. This new form of fair
use is adapted to avoid the enormous implications of holding home copiers
liable for infringement. It is dictated by congressional recognition of a
distinction between commercially motivated recording and de minimus
home recording and looks to the effect of the individual's recording on the
value of the copyright rather than the class effect. It is further supported by
the de minimus rationale of Aiken. For these reasons it should be concluded
that home use of Betamax does not infringe copyrights. While the congres-
sional response to the CATV cases and the inappropriateness of traditional
fair use in this context suggest the opposite conclusion, it cannot be doubted
that Betamax use fits the several criteria of the new home use exception. 20 8
205. See note 184 supra and accompanying text.
206. United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
207. Rohauser v. Friedman, 306 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1962); Cardinal Films, Inc. v. Republic
Pictures Corp., 148 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
208. According to Defendant's Pre-Trial Memorandum at 65, the individual user of Betamax
recorded 20 minutes of "Never Give An Inch," a motion picture copyrighted by Universal. He
has played the recording once so that his family could see it. On these facts, the vidiot's use
clearly falls within the scope of home use.
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